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1 Introduction
Globally, there is a wide range of efforts to
promote citizens’ participation in their own
security. Achieving such an objective may seem
challenging but several communities have been
involved in taking on responsibilities traditionally
related to the police systems and state. The
obstacle confronting this approach is often
pessimism of the citizenry regarding a top-down
strategy, which makes it difficult for citizens to
acquire ownership of security policies. However,
there exist grassroots security and justice
institutions that comprise a part of informal local
governance which are more active, accountable,
just and reliable for their people. Examples can
be found in Afghanistan’s south-east region (Loya
Paktia) and are known as Jirga and Arbakai. This
article will discuss the general structure of these
two informal governance institutions: Jirga is a
governing and judicial body at the community
level and Arbakai is a law enforcement body
implementing decisions made by the Jirga.
2 The current situation
At the time of writing, Afghanistan is a country
facing acute violence with domestic and
international dimensions, despite many efforts
by donors and the national government to
strengthen and reform its formal security and
justice institutions. Analysts seem to agree on
four main reasons for the failure of these
‘reformed’ institutions to secure the country:
The first concerns the exclusion of Pashtuns, the
country’s largest ethnic group from the political
arena and state security sector, which are instead
dominated by a small sub-tribe from a minority
ethnic group (the Panjshiris) under a weak state
led by foreign-backed leadership (Giustozzi
2007). In contrast to what is happening in Iraq,
in Afghanistan the legal support of the
international community is directed towards a
minority and the major ethnic group has few
political rights and little legal support. This
imbalance is explored in different analyses and
reports (Sedra 2004; ICG 2007).1
The second reason is widespread corruption
within the security sector and its various sub-
sectors, part of a general illness in the
government that undermines legitimacy of the
state ‘institutions’ in the ‘eyes of Afghans’ (ICG
2007: 14). A recently published International
Crisis Group (ICG) report documents the
Afghan public’s lack of confidence in the police
forces and views them as a source of failure.2
Corruption is not only limited to state
institutions, but also is a general problem in the
distribution of aid from donor agencies: up to
50 per cent of aid budgets are lost to corruption,
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fuelling dangerous public resentment that has
left ‘up to 60 per cent’ of the population feeling
dissatisfied (Beaumont 2007).
The third reason involves the drug economy and
the distribution of the proceeds across borders
between warring parties, including state officials
(especially those from security institutions), drug
traders and insurgents. Key government
positions in the area of counter-narcotics are sold
by senior level officials, and often the people
hired are obliged, based upon personal contracts,
to pay monthly or annual fees (ICG 2007).
The fourth reason is the presence of international
forces that comprise part of the problem, rather
than part of the solution (Luckham 2004; Sedra
2004: 6). These forces have caused an increased
number of civilian casualties. The newly elected
president of the USA said in his election
campaign that he will increase troops in
Afghanistan. The increased number of troops
despatched by the USSR in the 1980s only gave
more popularity to Mujahideen and did not have
a successful outcome for the occupiers.
The history of the country shows that Afghans
will never accept foreign presence in their
territory and will react by taking action against
the occupiers. Due to increased US airstrikes
near social gathering places and irresponsible
military performance, there have been several
recent incidents with, for example, 275 civilian
casualties (Afghanistan News Center 2008).
According to a 2007 Department for
International Development (DFID) (Galtung
2007) report, the crisis in the country is likely to
continue for many years and may finally result in
enormous failure with heavy casualties.
In this context of repeated failure by the security
sector to deliver security – even after some
security reform – there are bottom-up security
institutions in the south-east of Afghanistan
called Arbakai that are able to secure their areas,
serving as a successful example of a grassroots-
initiated security institution. These institutions
are effective, rooted in the society, and able to
deliver security to communities and individuals.
3 What is Arbakai?
Pashtun tribes in the south-east of Afghanistan
and bordering tribal areas live with their own
security and justice systems. They created their
own Arbakai, or tribally based policing and law
enforcement system, grounded in volunteer
grassroots initiatives. Arbakai is different from
militias and those systems hired by private
security companies that lack larger support and
embeddedness. The latter are hired security
groups deployed from the top-down by weak
states in developing countries, and sometimes
they are used for the benefit of powerful
warlords, such as private companies in
Afghanistan. Nor is Arbakai the same as state-
made community policing, which is also a top-
down system still characterised by passive
relations between the community and police.
This article explores the details of the Arbakai as
well as its leading institution, the Jirga, which
also has judicial functions. In Pashto, Arbakai
means ‘messenger’, and Arbakai has been
defined in many ways by tribal leaders as well as
other research scholars of Pashtunwali. As Ana
Pejcinova (2007) says, ‘Arbakai are institutions
kindred to local police, consisting of respected
community members who wear arms and protect
the village’. A recently published report from the
International Legal Foundation (ILF) about
customary law in Afghanistan states that the
enforcement system to implement final decisions
of the Jirga is called Arbakai (ILF 2004).
One of the tribal leaders in the region interviewed
by the author defined Arbakai as a group of
volunteer adults – selected through a special
procedure – who carry out the responsibilities to
implement the Jirga’s decisions, secure the territory
of the tribe or the respected community and take
action against those who perform illegal acts.
Similar institutions to Arbakai exist in other areas
but sometimes under a different name. For
instance, in Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), such institutions are called Salwishti and
Shalgoon, and in Kandahar, they are called Paltanai.
Detailed responsibilities of Arbakai differ from
one tribe to another. However, the major division
of Arbakai duties are as follows:
z To implement the Jirga’s decisions
z To maintain law and order
z To protect and defend borders and boundaries
of the tribe or community.
All of these three general categories have various
subcategories related to what is accepted as
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‘common/public good or threat’. It is important
to understand the concepts behind their power
and the extent to which they are autonomous.
However, imprisonment and the death penalty
do not exist under the Pashtunwali code of
conduct, nor does torture exist throughout the
whole tribal system.
The concepts responsible for upholding Arbakai
power are the following:
z Collectively accepted leadership of the
institution called the Jirga
z Equally shared benefits and interests of all
members of the tribe or the community
z Tribe or community members equally
responsible for all financial obligations and
expenses.
Building and strengthening trust and confidence
is crucial to any system, whether or not they are
state institutions. In the Arbakai, trust is built
upon (1) practical impartiality of Arbakai;
(2) communal and/or tribal confidence in the
leadership of Arbakai; and (3) the transparency
of every aspects of Arbakai’s work, which is
public and open to all.
4 Structure
Based upon information from interviewees,
Arbakai is a three-tier system that consists of
three levels:
1 Tribe level
2 Sub-tribe level
3 Community level.
Arbakai institutions function in a decentralised
way. Every level of Arbakai has its own leadership
(Jirga) – with financial and administrative as
well as decision-making power and autonomy
including managerial aspects and geographically
bounded areas. The decisions made by the Jirga
are based on consensus and done ‘deliberately’
fitting categorisations of participatory
governance (Fung and Wright 2003). The
financial power of the Jirga is not limited to the
collection of money but also includes
expenditures. Financial responsibilities include
logistical support to the Arbakai for tasks and
duties, managing Machalga3 and insurance
payment and distribution of achieved disputed
properties, land, forests and other natural
resources in the areas.
The Arbakai is responsible for implementing law
and order based on the decisions of the Jirga.
There is no way for a higher level Jirga to
influence decisions made by lower level Jirga
except through an appellate system or in cases
when the lower level is not able to resolve a
dispute. This happens when one of the parties of
a conflict is not satisfied with the decision made
by the Jirga. That person or party therefore has
the right to appeal to the upper level Jirga to
revisit the case. The same structure and power is
mirrored by the Arbakai at the upper level in
line with the Jirga.
5 Organisational arrangement of Arbakai
All three of the Arbakai’s tiers have the same
organisational arrangement with differences in
the level of responsibilities, functions and
numbers. The person who leads the Arbakai is
called Ameer, an Arabic word meaning ‘leader’ or
‘commander’ (Figure 1). Usage of this word in
the Arbakai system demonstrates the influence
of Islamic culture on this system.
It is worth exploring the membership tribe or
sub-tribe Jirga. One may think that everyone
who is rich or whose ancestors were Jirga
members will achieve membership. However,
leadership and being a member of the Jirga is
related to leadership skills and knowledge about
the Pashtunwali codes and its judiciary system,
no matter if a person is poor or rich, from a well-
known family or unknown family, or female or
male. If someone claims that Jirga membership
is inherited from fathers and grandfathers, it is
most likely because family members, including
sons and daughters who were serving the Jirga
meetings, can sit and listen to the issues
discussed by Jirga members, allowing them to
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Figure 1 The organisational chart of Arbakai and Jirga
institutions
Note As mentioned, the number of Arbakai differs
according to the levels and functions.
Tribal
Council
or Jirga
Ameer
(commander)
Arbakai members
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acquire knowledge and skills from such
involvement. A famous example concerns one of
the most qualified women, Maldara, in Khost.
She has the highest rank of all Jirga members in
the south-east region and her decisions cannot
be challenged. There are other female Jirga
members who are mostly from unknown families
within their tribes. One cannot achieve
membership at the highest level Jirga unless
he/she acquires membership in the lowest level
first. The number of Jirga members is
proportionate to the number of families in the
communities, sub-tribes and tribes. Every
community has representatives in the sub-tribe
Jirga and every sub-tribe has its own
representatives in the tribal Jirga.
6 Selection process of Arbakai
First, the chief figure in the tribal system is
Mirah (meaning ‘man’) but this is still related to
the code of Pashtunwali where Mirah is not just a
physically and biologically recognised man but
also includes social and moral elements. Mirah
means one who is honest, committed, and
transparent in his/her life and brave enough not
to act against those who are weak. There are
specific figures of Mirahs in every big family,
community, sub-tribe and tribe. There is another
term inserted in Pashtunwali terminology,
especially in the south-east, called Nowkar. This
refers to the number of people from each tribe
the central government called upon for military
service in the early twentieth century. Since then
the tribes have used it as a formula to determine
their proportion of Arbakai. As can be seen in
the tables, the number of Mirah is changeable
but the Nowkar is unchanged since the 1930s.
Table 1 shows the growing number of Mirah with
a consistent number of Nowkar for some tribes in
the south-east region.
Second, it needs to be determined how many
Arbakai members will be needed for the task to
be given to the Arbakai institution specified in
the Jirga’s decision. Once this number is
clarified, the Arbakai will be counted
proportionally to the whole population of Nowkars
at every sub-level. For instance, the Tanai tribe,
which is located in the border of Miranshah, the
capital town of north Wazirestan, has four
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Table 1 The growing number of Mirah with the number of Nowkar for some tribes in the south-east region
No. Tribe name No. of Mirah No. of Mirah No. of Nowkar
in 1930 in 2001
1 Khost Centre 48,000 170,000 12,000
2 Mangal 48,000 170,000 12,000
3 Zadran 36,000 135,000 9,000
4 Sabari 12,000 45,000 3,000
5 Tanai 12,000 45,000 3,000
6 Gurbuz 4,000 15,000 1,000
Table 2 Selection of Arbakai for forest protection in the Tinai sub-tribe
Name of No. of Mirah No. of Nowkar Percentage of No. of Arbakai 
sub-tribe sub-tribe Mirahs vs. members required
total Mirahs of tribe (%)
Darnoohee 22,500 1,500 50 40
Sitkai 7,500 500 16.6 13
Aryozee 7,500 500 16.6 13
Khaabkhil 7,500 500 16.6 13+1*
Total 45,000 3,000 100 80
*This is rotated with two other sub-tribes in their future turns.
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sub-tribes. There is a dispute concerning the
area of forest located in the mountains between
those living on the other side of the border and
the Tanai tribe. To protect and prove its
ownership of the forest, the Tanai tribe decided
to have 80 Arbakai continuously in the
mountains to protect the forest. This number of
Arbakai is calculated based on Nowkars numbered
proportionately from four sub-tribes, keeping in
mind that unlike the Mirah’s number, the Nowkar
number is constant and not changeable, as
shown in Table 2.
The point to note is that every Mirah on the list
currently exists, and every big family in which
this system is rooted knows who is on the list.
Systematically, those who are first on the list are
the initial ones to be assigned for certain duties,
such as protection of the forest in the case of the
Tanai tribe, as briefly described above.
This selection method has a vital difference
between the Arbakai and the Salwishti and
Shalgoon institutions. However, the concepts are
similar. In the Salwishti system the selection of
Arbakai originates from the 40th of 40 (1/40)
Mirahs and in the Shalgoon system the selection of
the Arbakai originates from the 20th of 20 (1/20)
Mirahs. Whether it is Salwishti or Shalgoon, the
system is related to the number of Arbakai
needed for one of the three general duties or any
task specified by the Jirga, such as implementing
a decision on a dispute.
7 Operational procedure and functions
To further understand the Arbakai, it will be
helpful to discuss operational procedures and the
functions related to the Arbakai. In principle, all
three functions of the Arbakai described earlier
(to implement the Jirga’s decisions of the Jirgas;
to maintain law and order and to protect the
borders and boundaries of the tribe or
community) are approved by the Jirga. The Jirgas
are the highest policy and decision-making
authority in the whole tribal system.
The operational procedure is different for any of
these three types of functions and the Arbakai
actions related to disputes have three types. First
is prevention of disputes and conflicts, which is the
law and order maintaining function; second is,
during disputes and conflicts, to promote
ceasefires between warring parties and to keep the
Jirga informed of the situation. In this case, the
Arbakai is never authorised to act autonomously
unless one of the warring parties does not accept
the ceasefire. Those who ignore the Arbakai will
face punishment and destruction of their homes.
After the Arbakai have secured the area,
intervened between warring parties and informed
the Jirga, it is then the responsibility of the Jirga
to solve the dispute or conflict. To implement the
Jirga’s resolution of the conflict is the third
function for the Arbakai. One principle for the
Jirga in conflict and dispute resolution is quick
decision-making and for the Arbakai to speedily
implement decisions, except in murder cases,
which require a slower process. The latter point is
based on two reasons. First, the Arbakai want to
investigate and collect more information to
understand the real reasons of the incident; and
second, Jirga members believe that being slow in
the decision-making process can psychologically
reduce the temper of the victimised party,
making it possible for them to accept a logic-
based solution rather than reacting emotionally.
After readiness of both sides to give Waak
(unconditional power to make decisions on their
behalf) to the Jirga, the Arbakai are asked for
Machalga. If a party does not accept the decision,
the money as Machalga will not be returned. Even
if they appeal to a higher level Jirga, the lower
level Jirga will be asked to explain the reasons
behind its decision. If the higher level Jirga is
satisfied with the decision, money will not be
returned. Otherwise, the objection of higher
level Jirga to the decision means that the money
of Machalga will go to the higher level Jirga. After
a decision has been made it passes to the
implementation phase through the Arbakai, and
their quick action is one of the most outstanding
specifications that satisfies the victimised party
and promotes trust in the Arbakai.
In short, it can be said that Arbakai are involved
in three phases of any given conflict or dispute:
(1) pre-conflict through maintaining law and
order and prevention of antisocial behaviour,
(2) during conflict, and (3) after the Jirga’s
decision to solve the conflict.
In the case of territorial protection, the Arbakai
has to constantly perform spot checks in
different areas and patrol during both day and
night. The Arbakai have strong support from the
community members who feel they have a
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responsibility to help and assist them by
informing them about something that may or
they know will happen.
8 Finance and expenditure
Arbakai receives its financial support from the
people through the Jirga, thus making the system
accountable to the Jirga and the people. There are
three financial sources that cover expenditures.
First, the Arbakai can acquire money collected by
the Jirga on the basis of equal shares from the
members of the community or tribe when there is
an Arbakai mission planned. The amount of the
money needed for such action is specified by the
Jirga according to its devised plan. In financing
Arbakai institutions, shares of the tribe’s members
are equal, whether the person is poor or rich. All
members have to pay their own share so that the
burden on any one individual is not too heavy. This
equal share and payment system gives equal power
to every member of the tribe to speak up when
they feel the Jirga or Arbakai is headed in a
mistaken direction. Such financial contribution
from community and tribe members will require a
type of strict accountability that is similar to the
relation that exists between taxation and
accountability (Joshi and Moore 2004).
Second, the Arbakai may use and spend the
money received through fines collected as a
result of punishment of a crime or antisocial
behaviour. Machalga is another financial source in
the case where one of the involved parties does
not accept the Jirga’s decision.
Third, the Jirga is equally obligated to collect
money from the people when it needs to pay
insurance to members threatened by one of
three risks: death, disability and loss of beauty
due to facial injuries.4
The financial sources mentioned have not only
made Jirga and Arbakai institutions autonomous
from the state, but they also made Arbakai
accountable to the members of the tribe. The
following section will concentrate on and explore
the different aspects and mechanisms of
accountability in Arbakai and Jirga systems.
9 Downward and upward accountability
mechanisms
In the Arbakai system, there is both upward and
downward accountability, which can guarantee
the sustainability of the system and avoid
corruption. Regarding upward accountability,
Arbakai is accountable to the Jirga who lead and
direct the Arbakai. The Jirga is a collective entity
that may guarantee transparency inside the Jirga
and can make it possible for Jirga members to
supervise the implementation of various tasks by
the Arbakai closely and carefully. There is clear
division of responsibilities between Jirga as a
decision-making body and Arbakai as an
implementing institution. The Jirga
management unit of Arbakai has the required
autonomy to make decisions and give power to
the Arbakai to implement the decisions. This
clarity in responsibilities makes it easy for the
Jirga and the people to track Arbakai and follow
accountability mechanisms.
One can find many examples of the Jirga
dismissing an Ameer or Arbakai due to inactivity
or involvement in corruption. For instance, based
on evidence from interviewees of the Tirizai tribe
of Khost province, its Arbakai was asked to
protect Mazarai5 until it was ripe for harvest. The
Jirga received reports that the Ameer of the
Arbakai was selling Mazarai when it was raw and
green. The Jirga dismissed the Ameer after an
eyewitness testimony, and he was blacklisted so
he could never be appointed Ameer or Arbakai
again.
There are also strong downward accountability
mechanisms that make the Arbakai system
trustworthy and sustainable. All three
dimensions of accountability – as explained by
Schedler (1999), ‘dissemination of information,
justification, and punishment’ – are in place. The
decisions made by the Jirga are public, and every
member of the tribe and community is allowed to
attend the Jirga’s meetings. The tribe members
also receive information through their
representative in the Jirga about the decision
made by the Jirga that the Arbakai will
implement. With respect to the dimension of
justification, every member of the tribe has the
right to ask their leaders and representatives to
justify their decisions. In the case where an
Arbakai acts against decisions by the Jirga, the
action will be rejected and those Arbakai
members involved will be blacklisted.
There are two reasons for the strength of
downward accountability mechanisms in the
system. First, there are equal financial shares to
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be paid for Arbakai by all members of the tribe.
This provides a way to improve quality of
governance and to make citizens’ engagement
more effective in all politically and socially
related matters through mutual obligations and
common goods and interests (Moore and
Schneider 2004: 47). The second reason is the
equal social status of all members that does not
discriminate with respect to wealth or social
status, which is aided by the fact that no caste
system exists within the region.
10 The Arbakai and the state
There is widespread discussion about how the
Arbakai can address the failure of the security
sector and incorporate more people into the
process. Some believe, such as Sedra (2004:
17–18), that it is necessary to integrate Arbakai
into the state security apparatus. However, Sedra
exaggerates the reality of the situation, insisting
on full integration within the security sector.
There is a danger of integrating such a successful
system with the failed security sector he describes.
He did not take into account the history of
Arbakai’s institutions and their creation, which
preceded the nation-state. Furthermore, Arbakai
follows Pashtuns’ customary law, while the state
police follow civil law. According to one tribal
leader, ‘Governments are coming and going but
our system is the same, they cannot change our
system’ (Heinrich Boll Foundation 2006).
11 Conclusion
Based on the observations in this article,
insecurity is of growing concern in Afghanistan.
It is not rational to expect and wish stability and
security from a state with weak institutions; a
failed security sector; the problematic presence
of international forces such as the USA
(Luckham 2004) and high corruption in service
and aid-providing entities. In a situation of
conflict and state crisis, the Arbakai are playing
an alternative role to provide security for the
people in the south-east region of the country
without posing a serious financial burden on the
people.
Based on this argument, it is clear that Arbakai
institutions are profoundly rooted in democracy
and have empowered participatory governance
(Fung and Wright 2003). Some of the key
principles and elements concerning observations
of the Arbakai are as follows:
z active and collective participation of tribes’
members in Arbakai institutions
z social embeddedness based on social cohesion
as key to supporting collective leadership, thus
creating strong accountability mechanisms
z merit-based nomination or election of Jirga
members as a leading institution to the Arbakai
z managerial and geographical decentralisation
adopted by three levels of Jirga and Arbakai
institutions
z strong mechanisms of upward and downward
accountability, based on three concepts:
(1) publicity of information, (2) justification,
and (3) punishment and enforcement in the
case of broken rules and regulations
z bottom-up approaches give full ownership to
the people, which cannot be achieved in top-
down programmes
z clear division of responsibilities between the
Jirga as the autonomous decision-making body
and Arbakai as the implementing institution
z equal power based on equal financial
contribution of all members of the tribe
z strong contextual and conceptual foundations
z proven to be a sustainable institution passing
through different periods of internal conflict
and external intervention.
According to the discussion above, it is possible
to engage the Jirga and Arbakai with the state,
as they are co-governance institutions. However,
it would be impractical and increasingly
challenging to integrate them completely into
the failed state apparatus.
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Notes
1 Part of earning trust and building a true
national institution is ensuring that the
population is reflected in the make-up of the
command and control structures. Both ethnic
and gender imbalances also need to be
addressed urgently (ICG 2007).
2 Chris Sands, ‘Bring Back Taliban to End
Police Corruption, say Afghan Truckers’,
Independent, 10 May 2007. ‘We pay all our
bribes to criminals, and they are criminals
who wear police uniforms’, said truck driver
Abad Khan. ‘Cargo Transporters go on Strike
Today: Truck Owners Threaten to Stop
Supplies to NATO Troops’, Daily Times, 27
April 2007; ‘Truckers Stop Supplies to NATO
in Afghanistan’, The News, 28 April 2007 (ICG
2007: 16).
3 Machalga is the surety given to the marakachyan
(Jirga members) by both sides of the case in
dispute, ensuring unconditional compliance of
the maraka’s decision. The Machalga is forfeited
against the side not accepting the maraka
sentence. Unless the Machalga is given, the
maraka will not be convened. When convened,
the maraka will ask both sides to pledge orally
that the side not accepting the decision will
not request return of its Machalga (Afghanan
Dot Net 2007).
4 A committee observes then presents their
findings to the Jirga, which assesses the value
of the damage and the appropriate amount of
money is given to the injured person.
5 A special plant growing in south-east
Afghanistan which is used to make beds called
katt, hats, ropes, etc.
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